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SYSTEM TRANSFORMATION
totalled between 900,000 and 1.1 million a year. The level of immigration described above as being required in the coming years is therefore already met by the existing flow of immigrants.
The majority of immigrants now come from Eastern Europe (ethnic Germans and non-German Eastern Europeans); Turks make up only a small part of the present net migratory flow-just under 50,000 a year between 1989 and 1991. In the next few years the press of immigrants from Eastern Europe and the new L&nder is expected to be considerable: between 300,000 and 400,000 people a year are expected to move West from the new L&nder for the next four or five years, up to 250,000 ethnic Germans will arrive and at least another 150,000 non-Germans from Eastern Europe will come until the year 2000.
To summarise, this means that:
[] in this decade, there is no great scope for additional Turkish immigrants, even in the Community context, as for political reasons alone it would be difficult to turn away immigrants from Eastern Europe, especially ethnic Germans.
[] In the first decade of the next century a controlled immigration of people, including Turks, would be conceivable in order to offset the decline in the potential labour force in Germany and the EC.
[] In the decade after that it might make sense to grant freedom of movement for Turkish workers, as the negative effects of the population decline would have to be offset throughout the Community. At the same time, the slowdown in population growth in Turkey should begin to affect the potential labour force in that country.
Finally, it should be noted that the employers of the future will be looking increasingly for skilled workers? 6 If Turkey wanted to actively enhance the emigration opportunities of its population, this factor would have to be taken into consideration, by improving the country's occupational training system, in particular, but also by teaching foreign languages. However, it is not likely that Turkey will make expensive investment in the educational system in order to give skilled workers a better chance in labour markets abroad. As mentioned above, there is a danger that the very people who would be interested in emigrating are those who are desperately needed for the economic development of their own country. that can be learned from these experiences is that a lack of credibility of government policy may be a serious obstacle to successful reforms) This paper shows that it is not the appropriate policy measure per se but only a credible government policy that is the source of efficiency gains. 2
The analysis of the credibility of government policy has been a central topic in economic theory since the late 1970s2 In contrast to its theoretical importance, the credibility of policy measures seems to play only a minor role in everyday policy-making. However, based on theoretical insights, the fear is that the desired positive effects of government activities will not be fully revealed, will fail to appear, or will even cause the initial economic situation to deteriorate as long as these policy measures do not appear sustainable. This is true for single policy areas such as tax/debt policy, monetary/disinflation policy, exchange-rate policy, and trade policy, but seems to be even more relevant in the case of comprehensive reforms. In particular, the neglect of credibility aspects may have far-reaching negative consequences for economies in transition. The possible effects of a lack of credibility are manifold; a lack of credibility [] has effects similar to macroeconomic distortions. Thus, the effects are similar to those of regulations, subsidies or taxes that do not aim to correct a market failure;
[] can cause additional costs for private agents to gather information; and [] stimulates the counterproductive activities of special interest groups.
The analogy between a lack of credibility and economic distortions can be easily demonstrated by looking at trade liberalizations.' Beside direct consumer benefits, trade reform aims at an efficient allocation of resources. It works only to the extent that it moves resources from one sector to another, typically from import-substituting industries to export-oriented sectors, according to international price signals. However, moving capital and labour in and out of sectors may entail considerable adjustment costs, such as labour-training costs or sunk costs due to sector-specific machinery. The willingness of entrepreneurs to bear these costs depends on the perceived sustainability of the trade reform. The private sector tends to postpone necessary and beneficiary adjustment in order to avoid a wasteful shifting of resources back and forth. The effects of a lack of credibility are comparable to a tax on new investment. Furthermore, the expectation that the trade reform will be reversed sometime in the future may lead to an intertemporal substitution of consumption towards the After two finance ministers had resigned in the first half of 1992 in Poland, the Economist chose the symptomatic title "Poland loses credibility". To reduce the uncertainty about future activities of the state, rational economic agents will gather costly information until the expected marginal benefits equal the marginal costs of obtaining an additional unit of information. Obviously, the reduction of uncertainties and therefore the enhancement of credibility could substantially reduce these costs.'
Beside these additional costs of gathering information, economic agents have an incentive to form new special interest groups or increase the activities of existing interest groups. The potential success of interest group activities is higher if the objectives of the government are unclear or its commitment to reform is low.
In contrast, the example of the newly industrialized countries (NICs) in Southeast Asia illustrates the advantages of credible policies. Compared to many Latin American countries, the NICs found it relatively easy to obtain external credits to diminish the negative consequences following the external shocks of the last decade (highly volatile interest rates, changing commodity prices and world demand) 6 (see Table 1 ).
Empirical analysis by Hiemenz, Nunnenkamp et al. 7 supports the argument that one objective of reforms, the promotion of investment activities, is better achieved if reforms are credible. Partial reforms in a highly distorted economy are not sufficient for a sustainable improvement of the economic situation. S o u r c e : Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
government policy, the main reasons why credibility problems may arise will be reviewed briefly in the following.
Reasons for a Lack of Credibility
A lack of credibility mainly arises because of inconsistent reforms, doubts about political sustainability, unclear government motives, the time-inconsistency of reforms and negative experiences with earlier policy measures.
One of the simplest reasons for a lack of credibility is when the announced reform violates ex ante budget constraints and accounting identities. The announcement of a drastic stabilization programme is hardly credible as long as the state still relies on revenue from inflation tax and no other new sources of revenue or expenditure cuts are available. The experiences of the Southern Cone countries during the 1970s demonstrate that inconsistent policies largely contribute to the ultimate failure of economic reforms. 8 In particular, the inappropriate policy mix of fixing the exchange rate to the US dollar without stopping the monetization of budget deficits and abolishing backward wage indexation schemes caused the programmes to fail. The 1986 Cruzado Plan in Brazil was similarly inconsistent. In an attempt to fight inflation, the government introduced a new currency, the Cruzado, and froze prices for goods and services without tackling the underlying problem, namely the high budget deficit. For economies in transition, a lack of credibility may result from the continued existence of"soft budget constraints". 9 As long as individual income streams appear flexible, because the state directly subsidizes potential lossmakers, increasing pressure on the state budget may ultimately lead to the re-emergence of inflation. Even if reforms are consistent, doubts about their political sustainability may create credibility problems. At least in the short run, nearly every comprehensive reform is accompanied by undesired distributional effects. The expectation of considerable political opposition makes entrepreneurs reluctant to adjust immediately and may increase pressure to revert reforms. Zambia's ambitious reform programme is a primary example? ~ The government cut public expenditure, reduced subsidies to urban consumers, and started to auction foreign exchange. The induced depreciation of the domestic currency increased prices for imports, as well as the general price index. Urban unrest followed and the government ultimately reversed the reforms.
Unclear government motives may also contribute to a lack of credibility. Under rapidly deteriorating economic conditions, governments may tend to accept any conditionality simply to satisfy large creditors (e.g. World Bank, International Monetary Fund) temporarily. If the public anticipates that the reform is likely to be reversed soon because the government itself is not convinced of the necessity of substantial changes, a reform can hardly be credible. This scenario seems to be a reasonable description of the situation in many African countries or of the Philippine trade reform under President Marcos? 1
Even if there are no doubts about the government's general willingness to reform, the time inconsistency of policy measures may present a serious obstacle to success. A policy is time inconsistent when policy decisions that are optimal from the current viewpoint will no longer be optimal in the future, even though no relevant new information has been available in the meantime. This concept can easily be applied to comprehensive SYSTEM TRANSFORMATION economic reforms. Under the assumptions that comprehensive reforms followthe pattern of a J-curve 12 in production and employment and governments want to cushion the temporary decline in production and employment, a typical time inconsistency problem may arise. 13 It is ex ante optimal for the government to announce a comprehensive stabilization-cumliberalization programme. Rational private agents, however, anticipate the government's incentive to renege on earlier announcements and form expectations accordingly. After the private sector has formed its expectations, it is indeed no longer optimal for the government to stick to its previous announcement. The government's actual adjustment efforts will be smaller than socially optimal. The adjustment efforts will be weaker, the stronger the government's inclination to cushion the short-run decline in production and employment, the smaller the expected long-run benefits of the reform (and the less weight the government attaches to long-run effects), and the less the government's concern about its reputation. Reform efforts would be stronger if the government were credible or able to commit itself to comprehensive reforms.
Independent of concrete government objectives, the credibility of government policy may depend, to a large extent, on country-specific economic and political history (cf. Table 2 ). In an extremely volatile political environment, where changes in government occur frequently, a perpetual lack of confidence is created. Political instability often goes hand in hand with economic instability ( Table   Table 2 Changes in Government, 1970 to Present, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil 1970-8/1971 Juan Jose Torres (deposed) Military 8/1971 Military 8/ -7/1978 Hugo B~.nzer Su~.rez Military-civilian(1971 Military-civilian( -1973 military (1973 -1978 ) 7/1978 -11/1978 Juan Pereda Asbl3n (deposed) Directly elected 11/1978-8/1979 David Padilla Military (transitional) 8/1979-11/1979 W&lter Guevara Arze (deposed) Civilian-interim 11/1979 Natusch Busch Military 11/1979 -6/1980 Lydia Gueiler (deposed) Civilian-interim 6/1980 Civilian-interim 6/ -8/1981 Luis Garia Mesa (deposed) Military 8/1981 Military 8/ -9/1981 Military junta 9/1981-7/1982 Celso Torrelie Villa (deposed) Military 7/1982 Military 7/ -10/1982 Guido Vildoso Calderon Military (transitional) 10/1982-8/1985 Hernan Siles Zuazo Indirectly elected 8/1985-8/1989 Paz Estenssoro Directly elected 8/1969-Jaime Paz Zamora Directly elected 10/1969 -3/1974 Emilio Garrastazu Medici Military 3/1974 -3/1979 Ernesto Geisel Military 3/1979 -3/1985 Joao Baptista Figueiredo Military 3/1985 -3/1990 Jose 1 Monthly averages refer to periods from January of the first year to December of the last year except for 1990, for which most data reach only up to January-February. 
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Enhancing Credibility
Having analyzed the importance of and main reasons for a lack of credibility, the possibilities of coping with this serious obstacle to success should be discussed. In general, a lack of credibility see ms to be of less i m portan ce in more flexible economies, where the shifting of resources in and out of sectors is less costly. The removal of rigidities that hinder the adjustment process, as well as an economic policy that encourages mobility (e.g. labour training programmes), may help to reduce the possible negative effects of a lack of credibility. 
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1990 to 4.3% in March 1990. The collapse of output, the increasing unemployment and the persistence of inertia inflation which followed, however, indicate that stabilization and liberalization need to be complemented by other measures. More detailed analyses have pointed to the importance of hardening budget constraints and comprehensive financial market reforms early in the transformation process. 18
Beside signalling its commitment, a government can try to "tie its own hands" and thereby reduce its ability to reverse reforms. Rodrik '9 uses the illustrative analogy of Ulysses, who had hi mself tied to the mast of his ship so that he could not be trapped by the Sirens' call. The creation of independent institutions, such as an independent central bank, backed by a constitutional or less fundamental law may reduce the government's ability to follow a shortsighted policy. Moreover, the policymaker can appoint a conservative central banker, who places a higher weight on inflation-stabilization than the policymaker himself (the public). 2~ Furthermore, entering into agreements with international organizations or institutions may help to increase credibility. Typical examples refer to IMFprogrammes or joining the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAI-r). Mexico seems to have used entry into the GATE to reduce the uncertainty associated with its recent trade liberalization.
In addition, using an exchange-rate policy has been suggested as a means of"tying one's hands". The theory of comparative advantage provides this proposal with an appealing basis. Developed market economies are supposed to have a comparative advantage in providing credibility. Consequently, developing countries or Central and East European countries could benefit from importing that credibility. By assigning all monetary functions to one or more Western economies or by joining a currency union credibility could be enhanced. 21
Although credibility will be increased if the perceived political costs of exit rise, all these examples demonstrate that the literature on credibility is still in its infancy, laws can sometimes be changed easily, institutions dismantled, exchange-rate regimes abandoned, and politicians (central bankers) removed from office.
Furthermore, the attempt to increase credibility by "tying one's hands" is not without costs. The policymaker's flexibility in responding to external shocks is artificially reduced. As a result, the ex ante optimal policy commitment would be contingent on the state of the world. However, in practice, it is impossible or prohibitively costly to foresee and specify all possible contingencies. Recently, Lohmann 22 has demonstrated that escape clauses or the ability of policymakers to override the decisions of an independent central banker, for example, may improve welfare. In her analysis, a partially independent conservative central banker dominates a number of other institutional frameworks. The perceived trade-off between credibility enhancing commitments and a loss of flexibility clearly deserves further research.
Finally, governments can enhance their credibility by sticking to their announcements, thereby gradually improving their reputation. In this context, it seems to be of special importance that the potential beneficiaries of the reform are identified and organized in order to prevent counterproductive political opposition. 23
Concluding Remarks
It is argued that government policy has to be credible in order to lead to the desired positive effects. Theoretical analyses, as well as the experiences of many developing countries with stabilization and liberalization programmes, support the importance of credibility aspects.
To increase the credibility of a comprehensive reform governments should signal commitment. Even a simple announcement may be informative, because the public knows that a policymaker who reneges on promises incurs a cost. Hence, a statement may convey some new information about the likelihood of a specific policy measure. 24
Furthermore, governments can tie their own hands in order to reduce uncertainty about their political decisions. "Tying one's hands" is not without its costs, but it seems to be necessary for enhancing credibility. With increasing confidence in government policy, improved reputation may be a valuable substitute for self-imposed ties. 
